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Abstract:
Research shows that many animal species have morphological and cognitive
adaptations for fighting with others to gain resources, but it remains unclear how humans
make fighting decisions. Non-human animals often adaptively calibrate fighting behavior
to ecological variables such as resource quantity and whether the resource is distributed
uniformly or clustered in patches. Also, many species use strategies to reduce fighting
costs such as resolving disputes based on power asymmetries or conventions. Here we
show that humans apply an ownership convention in response to the problem of severe
fighting. We designed a virtual environment where ten participants, acting as avatars,
could forage and fight for electronic food items (convertible to cash). In the patchy
condition, we observed an ownership convention—the avatar who arrives first is more
likely to win—but in the uniform condition, where severe fighting is rare, the ownership
convention is absent.
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Introduction
A wealth of theoretical and empirical research in evolutionary biology addresses
how animals interact with respect to resources such as territory, food, or mates (Brown,
1964; Kokko, Lopez-Sepulcre, A., & Morrell, L. J., 2006; Maher & Lott, 2000; Maynard
Smith, 1982; Parker, 1974). Broadly, this research shows that many animals make
nuanced and adaptive decisions about whether, and how intensely, to fight others to
secure a resource. Investigations of territorial behavior have identified as many as twenty
ecological variables that affect decisions about whether to fight, including food quantity,
food distribution, population density, and predation levels (Maher & Lott, 2000). Another
line of research has discovered that when fights do occur, animals use a variety of
strategies to reduce the costs such as fighting assessment (Parker, 1974) and conventions
(Maynard Smith, 1982). However, despite a large literature on fighting in non-human
animals—including mammals, birds, fish, and insects—little is known about how humans
make fighting decisions.
Several scholars have applied theories from biology to understand how humans
secure resources, deriving novel conclusions relevant to economics and property law
(Gintis, 2007; Krier, 2009; Stake, 2004). These accounts particularly draw on Maynard
Smith’s (1982) concept of a fighting convention or an “uncorrelated asymmetry” in
which animal fights are resolved based on an asymmetry that is uncorrelated with
fighting ability. Maynard Smith’s analysis led to the counterintuitive conclusion that
animal fights can be more than battles of brawn: Choosing whether to fight or flee based
on a conventional asymmetry, such as prior possession, can be an evolutionarily stable
strategy (ESS) because individuals thereby reduce fighting costs relative to others who
ignore the convention. In humans, resource disputes are decided by more than sheer
power, and hence, the strategic convention model could potentially explain the
foundations of human property. However, no previous research has tested this hypothesis
in humans using the standard experimental methods applied to non-human species.
The idea that human property is rooted in an individually advantageous strategic
convention contradicts much of the received wisdom on the subject. Scholars throughout
history have offered theories of property which hinge on verbal communication,
individual reputation, productive labor, legal institutions, enforcement by authority, and
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other complexities of human social life (Bentham, 1802; Grotius, 1625; Hobbes, 1647;
Hume, 1740; Kant, 1797; Locke, 1689; Pufendorf, 1672; Rousseau, 1762). If, instead,
basic features of human property can arise from very simple pairwise conflicts, as in
species with minimal social interaction, then ownership reflects a core human
competency which does not depend on advanced social abilities such as language,
reputation, or third-party enforcement.
A Virtual Environment for Disputes
We test whether human fighting decisions are sensitive to resource distribution
(uniform or patchy), asymmetries in power, and asymmetries in prior possession. We
designed custom software to create a virtual environment for observing human resource
disputes (see Methods). In each experimental session, ten participants operate avatars in a
virtual environment where they can forage and fight for food items which are convertible
to cash (Supplementary Video 1). To secure resources, participants can “strike” each
other, which, implemented through avatars, causes financial losses but not physical harm
(Figure 1). This allows us to use methods similar to those used in non-human animal
studies where animals engage in actual fighting. In the environment, avatars can move to
find shrubs, enter/exit shrubs, and consume berries inside shrubs. Avatars gain one
“health point” for each berry consumed, increasing their health meter (0-100 points) and
offsetting health losses from metabolism which occurs at a rate of -10 points per minute.
Participants’ cash earnings accumulate continuously in proportion to the health of their
avatars, providing financial incentives to maximize health. When two avatars enter the
same shrub, they have an “interaction” in which each avatar can (1) Leave, allowing the
other avatar to consume berries, (2) Smile, which produces a smile, or (3) Strike, which
costs the striker one health point and imposes a greater cost (3 or 5 points) on the
individual who is struck. Participants remain in the interaction, where they can smile or
strike repeatedly, until one avatar leaves the shrub. Finally, we designed an
experimenter’s monitor (not observed by participants) showing the movements and
interactions of all ten participants in the environment in real time and allowing
experimental sessions to be replayed from complete records of participants’ actions
(Supplementary Videos 2 and 3).
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We tested the hypothesis that resource distribution affects fighting behavior
(defendability theory, Brown, 1964) by manipulating whether resources were distributed
uniformly or clustered in patches, holding quantity constant. In the patchy condition, 10
brown shrubs produced 5 berries per minute and 5 green shrubs produced 20 berries per
minute (total = 150 berries per minute). In the uniform condition, 30 brown shrubs
produced 5 berries per minute (total = 150 berries per minute). We also tested whether
participants could resolve resource disputes by using asymmetries in power (created by
the experimenter) or asymmetries in prior residence. We manipulated power by randomly
assigning half of participants to be Small avatars, whose strikes cause 3 health points of
damage, and the other half to be Large avatars, whose strikes cause 5 health points of
damage. The Large avatars appeared noticeably larger on the screen than the Small
avatars (Figure 1).
Results
We observed more intense fighting in the patchy condition than in the uniform
condition (Table 1). Participants’ interactions lasted longer and they involved more
strikes in the patchy condition than in the uniform condition. Participants’ strikes reduced
their aggregate cash payoffs by an average of $53.80 for (10-participant) sessions in the
patchy condition versus $7.12 for sessions in the uniform condition. We also observed
more smiles per interaction in the patchy condition. The Smile option was originally
included so participants would not think the experimenters expected them to strike.
Surprisingly, participants frequently used the “cheap talk” smiles and often in extended
bouts, suggesting use as a low cost threat display. Last, we observed more deaths in the
patchy condition (11/60) than in the uniform condition (0/60), p < .001, Fisher’s exact
test.
We analyzed whether asymmetries predicted the winner, defined as the avatar
who remained in the shrub after the other individual exited. In the patchy condition, the
prior resident defeated the intruder in 71.39% of cases (n = 1,248), significantly greater
than chance (p < .001, binomial test). When there was a size difference, Large avatars
tended to defeat Small avatars (66.76%, n = 719, p < .001). When there was a health
difference, more healthy avatars tended to defeat less healthy avatars (66.37%, n = 1,219,
p < .001). This initial analysis suggests that humans are able to use several asymmetries
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to resolve disputes. We observed a different pattern of results in the uniform condition.
The residence effect was not only reduced, but significant in the opposite direction: Prior
residents were slightly more likely to be first to exit a shrub (44.31%, n = 589, p = .006).
Similarly, we observed no size effect (54.84%, n = 341, p = .08) and no health effect
(49.91%, n = 559, p = 1.00). These results show that in the uniform condition, where
severe fighting was rare, participants did not generally use asymmetries to decide
conflicts. Hence, we focused further analysis on disputes in the patchy condition.
For the patchy condition, we tested whether fighting behavior differed for
interactions in brown shrubs (n = 234) and green shrubs (n = 1014). Disputes lasted
longer (seconds) for green shrubs (M = 4.60, SD = 5.56) than brown shrubs (M = 2.10,
SD = 1.99), t(1246) = 6.78, p < .001. There were more smiles per interaction for green
shrubs (M = 2.43, SD = 4.61) than brown shrubs (M = 0.93, SD = 1.60), t(1246) = 4.89, p
< .001. There were more hits per interaction for green shrubs (M = 0.50, SD = 1.25) than
brown shrubs (M = 0.05, SD = 0.29), t(1246) = 5.48, p < .001. Additionally, we found
that asymmetries influenced conflict outcomes in green shrubs but not brown shrubs. For
green shrubs, we observed a residence effect (75.54%, n = 1,014, p < .001), size effect
(68.66%, n = 584, p < .001), and health effect (69.35%, n = 995, p < .001). However, for
brown shrubs, there were no significant effects of residence (53.42%, n = 234, p = .33),
size (58.52%, n = 178, p = .06), or health (53.13%, n = 224, p = .39). These results show
that, consistent with theories about resource distribution, fighting is more severe for
clustered resources, and furthermore, people selectively use asymmetries to resolve
disputes over severely contested resources but not for less contested resources.
To better understand the relative effects of prior residence and fighting
assessment, we concentrated on disputes over green shrubs. We examined whether the
residence effect was a byproduct of a tendency for more powerful Large avatars to be
residents (e.g., see Kemp & Wiklund, 2004; Pryke & Andersson, 2003). Figure 2 shows
the resident effect by the sizes of resident and intruder (“Small-Large” indicates Small
resident and Large intruder). When sizes are matched in Large-Large and Small-Small
interactions, we observed a strong residence effect, showing that this effect cannot be
reduced to a size/power effect. Additionally, when size differs (Large-Small and SmallLarge), residence significantly affects the frequency of wins for Large avatars (84% vs.
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46%), χ2(1, n = 584) = 97.85, p < .001. The relative strengths of residence and size
effects can be compared by considering the Small-Large conflicts in which these two
asymmetries are opposed. In our environment, neither effect dominated: When Small
residents faced Large intruders there was no statistical difference in frequencies of
victory. Further, we predicted that the Small-Large conflicts would be the most severe
fights precisely because these asymmetries are opposed. Indeed, disputes lasted longer
for Small-Large interactions (M = 6.36, SD = 5.90) than other types (M = 4.08, SD =
5.35), f(1, 1010) = 27.04, p < .001, disputes had more smiles for Small-Large interactions
(M = 3.08, SD = 4.30) than other types (M =2.23, SD = 4.68), f(1, 1010) = 4.93, p = .027,
and disputes had more hits for Small-Large interactions (M = 0.87, SD = 1.57) than other
types (M = 0.39, SD = 1.11), f(1, 1010) = 24.44, p < .001.
We looked more closely at the mechanics of the residence effect. In non-humans,
individuals of some species do not contest residence whereas in other species residents
win because they fight harder (see Kokko et al., 2006). We tested whether the residence
effect occurred not only in shorter interactions but also in escalated conflicts. We
categorized interactions as escalated disputes with durations in the top quartile, duration
> 5 seconds (n = 282), or non-escalated disputes with duration ≤ 5 seconds (n = 732). We
observed residence effects in escalated disputes (71.99%, p < .001) and non-escalated
disputes (76.91%, p < .001), and the difference between these proportions was not
significant, χ2(1, n = 1,014) = 2.67, p = .10. We examined whether residents were willing
to incur more costs than intruders before giving up a fight over a green shrub. For fight
duration, participants waited significantly longer before giving up when they were
residents (M = 5.31, SD = 6.15) than when they were intruders (M = 4.37, SD = 5.34),
t(1,012) = 2.31, p = .021. For strike costs, participants withstood greater damage in health
points before giving up when they were residents (M = 2.71, SD = 5.35) than when they
were intruders (M = 1.30, SD = 3.46), t(1,012) = 4.82, p < .001. Together, these results
show that the residence effect reflects more than a tendency for intruders to yield, without
contest, to prior residents. Prior residence shapes not only whether fights escalate but also
how hard each side fights during an escalated conflict.
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Logit Model of Resident Wins
We used a logit analysis to examine how our experimental manipulation of
resource distribution affected the residence convention. To estimate how much of the
resident effect in the patchy condition vis-à-vis uniform condition can and cannot be
explained by differences in size, hits, and health of the participants, we conducted a
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition on a logit model of resident wins (Fairlie, 2005). The
percentage of the residence effect that cannot be explained by the observable
characteristics of the interactions can be attributed to different social processes caused by
the experimental manipulation of resource distribution. For each interaction, either the
resident remains in the shrub and the intruder leaves (Y = 1) or vice versa (Y = 0). We
assume that a set of observable factors x listed in Table 2 explain the decision, so that
Prob(Y = 1) = Λ(β'x), where Λ(.) is the logistic distribution. The standard Blinder-Oaxaca
decomposition of the patchy (P) / uniform (U) gap in the average value of Y can be
expressed as:

[

][

Y P − Y U = βˆ P ' ( x P − x U ) + (βˆ P − βˆ U )′ x U

],

(1)
where β̂ is a vector of estimated coefficients for condition i. The first term in brackets is
i

the explained difference in resident wins due to the difference in observed characteristics
in the two conditions, and the second is the unexplained difference due to differences in
residence conventions. Following Fairlie (2005), the logit decomposition can be written
as:
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where ni is the number of observations for condition i.1 Like those of any nonlinear
regression model, the estimated coefficients are not necessarily the marginal effects.
Hence, we computed the partial derivatives for the patchy condition (Table 2) and the
uniform condition (Supplementary Table 1).

1

The results are largely unaffected if we use a probit specification. Equation (2) holds exactly for the logit
model with a constant term, and hence our choice in reporting that model’s estimates.
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Confirming the results reported above, neither resident size nor intruder size
affect the likelihood that the resident wins (p = .160 and .306, respectively). Each hit by a
(Small) resident increases the likelihood that the resident wins by 10 percentage points (p
< .001), and symmetrically each hit by an (Small) intruder reduces the likelihood by 10
percentage points (p = .001). Moreover, hits by a Large resident and Large intruder have
larger effects (p = .009 and .002, respectively). The health of residents and intruders have
expected signs and similar offsetting marginal effects. Also, time in residence (prior to an
interaction) predicts victory: For every 10 seconds in residence the likelihood of winning
increases by 2 percentage points (p < .001), a result which has also been found in nonhuman species (Alcock & Bailey, 1997; Haley, 1994). Finally, gender and the number of
smiles for both residents and intruders have no significant effect. All but three of the
fixed effects for periods are insignificantly different from the baseline of period 20.
Residents in the patchy condition maintain ownership of the shrub 71.4% of the
time (a = .714), whereas only 44.3% of uniform residents retain the shrub (c = .443). Of
particular interest is how much of this difference can be explained by hits, health, and
size. We find that nearly exactly half of this difference, a – b = .136 to be precise, can be
explained by the different observed tendencies and characteristics of the residents and
intruders. That leaves a rather large amount of the resident effect (b – c = .135) to
attribute to different social processes caused by the experimental manipulation of
resource distribution.2 When a valuable resource was concentrated, participants quickly
(within a 20-minute experiment) adopted a convention of prior residence and that
explains half of the difference in resident wins between the two treatment conditions.
Discussion
Previous research shows that numerous animals—ranging from caterpillars
(Yack, Smith, & Weatherhead, 2001) to songbirds (Carpenter & MacMillen, 1976) to
elephant seals (Haley, 1994)—have evolved cognitive mechanisms which adaptively
manage resource disputes. Importantly, these regulatory mechanisms are not generally
well-described as “fixed instincts” or as “hardwired,” but oppositely, research reveals
sophisticated computational control systems which process information about ecological
variables and specific adversaries to adaptively deploy offensive, defensive, and evasive
2

With a probit specification the estimate of b – c is 53.1% of a – c.
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maneuvers (reviewed by Kokko et al., 2006; Maher & Lott, 2000). These discoveries
raise questions about the mental competencies that humans bring to bear on resource
disputes. Ethnographic studies have investigated the sensitivity of human territoriality to
key ecological variables (Baker, 2003; Cashden, 1983; Dyson-Hudson & Smith, 1978).
Also, recent laboratory studies indicate that humans are able to assess fighting ability
(Sell et al., 2009) and that this information regulates anger toward antagonists (Sell,
Tooby, & Cosmides, 2009). However, no previous research has applied the standard
experimental methods from the non-human literature to investigate human fighting
decisions.
We report experimental evidence showing that human fighting decisions are
sensitive to resource distribution, asymmetries in power, and asymmetries in prior
residence. The human residence effect shown here is of particular importance given
centuries of debate about the foundations of human property. We observed an ownership
convention in an experimental environment which allowed minimal social behavior—
dyadic hitting and smiling—without language use, reputation, or third-party intervention.
Ownership did not go uncontested, but rather, residents tended to fight harder than
intruders, and further, participants applied the convention selectively for green shrubs but
not brown shrubs. This evidence supports recent proposals that the foundation of human
property is the ability to apply strategic conventions, or “uncorrelated asymmetries”
(Maynard Smith, 1982), to reduce the costs of severe fighting (Gintis, 2007; Krier, 2009;
Stake, 2004).
Many scholars have argued for the fundamental importance of property in human
societies (Alchian & Demsetz, 1973; De Soto, 2000; Demsetz, 1967; Ellickson, 1991;
North, 1981; Ostrom, 1990). If humans have specialized cognitive abilities for managing
resource disputes, then these computational systems shape individual behavior and
population-level patterns (e.g., Lopez-Sepulcre & Kokko, 2005) like in non-human
species (Mougeot et al., 2003). This puts a high priority on understanding the cognitive
competencies behind ownership and how they interact with the complexities of social life
to generate the human world of “mine” and “thine.”
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Methods
We recruited N = 120 undergraduate participants (50% female) for an hour-long
experiment, although the actual duration was less than 40 minutes. Participants were paid
$7 for showing up and they earned additional money as a result of their decisions in the
experiment (M = $20.09, SD = $8.92). Participants were randomly assigned to one
experimental condition, either the patchy condition or the uniform condition. There were
six sessions per experimental condition with ten participants each. Participants were
taken into the laboratory and seated at computer stations separated by partitions to
preserve anonymity. Participants were presented with a virtual environment on their
computer screens. Ten participants were placed together in the same virtual environment.
They read a set of experimental instructions describing the environment and the
capabilities of their avatars (Supplementary Methods) and then the experiment began.
The experiment lasted for 20 periods (one minute each) but participants did not know the
number of periods in advance in order to eliminate potential end-game effects. After the
experiment, participants were individually and anonymously paid their show-up payment
plus experimental earnings and then dismissed.
Virtual environment software. We designed custom software which creates a
virtual environment for observing human resource disputes (Supplementary Videos 1-3).
The software is written in Visual Basic and is available from the authors upon request. In
the environment, avatars can move to find shrubs, enter/exit shrubs, and consume berries
inside shrubs. Shrubs produce berries continuously during one minute periods and berries
that are not consumed disappear at the onset of the next period. Avatars have a health
meter (0-100 points) which begins at 90 points, decreases through metabolism at a rate of
-10 points per minute, and increases when berries are consumed. Participants’ cash
earnings accumulate continuously during the experiment in proportion to their avatar’s
health (Supplementary Methods). At maximum health, additional berries add “bonus
points” which increase cash earnings but do not further increase health; this feature was
designed to limit the health available for fighting to limit health asymmetries. If
participants reach zero health, then their avatars die, participation in the experiment ends,
and they receive their accumulated earnings but cannot earn additional money.
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Participants cannot see others’ avatars unless two individuals enter the same shrub
(for discussion, see Maher & Lott, 2000). In this case, the two participants are taken to an
“interaction” screen. During an interaction, other avatars cannot enter the shrub; clicking
causes a message indicating that the shrub is full. On the interaction screen, the prior
occupant is in front of the shrub and the newcomer is shown approaching (Figure 1).
Each participant has three options: (1) Leave, which causes the avatar to exit the shrub,
allowing the other avatar to pick berries, (2) Smile, which has no effects aside from
causing the avatar to smile, and (3) Strike, which causes the avatar to hit the other avatar,
costing the striker one health point and imposing a greater cost (3 or 5 points) on the
other individual. After a strike, there is a three second delay before another strike can be
delivered; this feature was designed to eliminate advantages based on clicking speed. The
three second strike delay was also imposed at the outset of the interaction to eliminate the
potential for surprise attacks. Similarly, after a participant exited a shrub, there was a five
second delay before they could enter the same shrub.
The software allows the experimenter to control the number, location, color, and
productivity of the shrubs as well as the size and capabilities of the avatars. We
manipulated resource distribution in two experimental conditions (6 sessions each). In the
patchy condition, there were 10 brown shrubs, which produced 5 berries per minute, and
5 green shrubs, which produced 20 berries per minute (total = 150 berries per minute).
After each period, one of the five green shrubs was randomly selected and changed to a
brown shrub and a corresponding brown shrub changed to a green shrub. This feature
was designed to increase turnover in residence in green shrubs. In the uniform condition,
there were 30 brown shrubs which produced 5 berries per minute (total = 150 berries per
minute). We manipulated power by randomly assigning half of participants to be Small
avatars, whose strikes cause 3 health points of damage, and the other half to be Large
avatars, whose strikes cause 5 health points of damage. The Large avatars appeared
considerably larger on the screen than the Small avatars (Figure 1).
The software produces data files which record all of the participants’ actions in
the virtual environment. During the experiment, participants’ actions are displayed on an
experimenter’s monitor showing all participants’ avatars in the environment, and
experimental sessions can be replayed from the data (Supplementary Videos 2 and 3).
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Table 1
Session Summary Statistics by Condition
Patchy
Uniform
M
SD
M
SD t(10) p
a
% of berries extracted
74
3
57
2
11.99 <.001
% time moving
46
4
71
2
14.19 <.001
% time in shrubs
40
4
25
2
8.57 <.001
% time in interactions
14
2
4
1
15.76 <.001
# interactions
208
34
98
13
7.46 <.001
Time/interaction (sec) 4.24
0.90
2.33
0.34 4.89 <.001
Smiles/interaction
2.23
0.84
1.20
0.37 2.75 .021
Strikes/interaction
0.43
0.15
0.11
0.09 4.56 .001
Total strike costs (points) 451
139
52
35
6.80 <.001
Total strike costs ($)
53.80 20.21
7.12
6.44 5.39 <.001
Total earnings ($)
226.86 32.73
174.91 9.75 3.73 .0039
Note. Summary statistics from six experimental sessions in each condition.
Each of the twelve sessions had ten participants (N = 120).
a
Percentage of the total (3,000) available berries extracted by participants.
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Table 2
Patchy Condition: Logit Analysis of Resident Wins
Variable
Coefficient
Standard error
p
Hits by resident
0.0995
0.0312
.001
Smiles by resident
-0.0047
0.0063
.451
Health of resident
0.0020
0.0005
<.001
Hits by Large resident
0.1357
0.0516
.009
Hits by intruder
-0.1037
0.0313
.001
Hits by Large intruder
-0.1219
0.0387
.002
Smiles by intruder
0.0103
0.0067
.125
Health of intruder
-0.0016
0.0005
.001
Time in shrub by resident
0.0021
0.0002
<.001
Marginal effect for dummy variable is P|1 - P|0
Large resident
0.0381
0.0271
0.160
Large intruder
-0.0279
0.0272
0.306
Large resident*Large intruder
0.0247
0.0350
0.480
Female resident
0.0319
0.0274
0.244
Female intruder
-0.0235
0.0262
0.369
Female resident*Female intruder
-0.0385
0.0418
0.358
Period1
-0.1011
0.0946
0.285
Period2
-0.0972
0.0926
0.294
Period3
-0.1710
0.1107
0.123
Period4
-0.1092
0.0911
0.231
Period5
0.0339
0.0505
0.501
Period6
-0.0497
0.0729
0.496
Period7
-0.0629
0.0752
0.403
Period8
-0.0307
0.0675
0.649
Period9
0.0533
0.0451
0.237
Period10
0.0632
0.0437
0.148
Period11
0.0648
0.0414
0.117
Period12
0.0247
0.0537
0.646
Period13
0.0761
0.0354
0.032
Period14
0.0114
0.0537
0.832
Period15
0.0371
0.0488
0.448
Period16
-0.0626
0.0814
0.442
Period17
0.0204
0.0589
0.729
Period18
0.0741
0.0397
0.062
Period19
0.0965
0.0345
0.005
Note. Partial derivatives of probabilities with respect to the vector of
characteristics for patchy condition. Values are computed at the means of
the continuous variables and at zero for all dummy variables (n = 1248).
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Video 1. Demonstration of virtual environment. The video shows the computer interface
for the virtual environment as it was experienced by participants. It shows a Small avatar
moving to find shrubs and consume berries. It also shows the avatar in interactions with
others and using smiles and strikes.
Video 2. Experimenter’s monitor for patchy condition. The video shows a monitor of
participants’ actions in the virtual environment as observed by the experimenter (not the
participants). It shows actual data replayed from session 1 of the patchy condition.
Video 3. Experimenter’s monitor for uniform condition. The video shows a monitor of
participants’ actions in the virtual environment as observed by the experimenter (not the
participants). It shows actual data replayed from session 1 of the uniform condition.

Video Download Links
WMV Format:
Video 1: http://dl.dropbox.com/u/4745232/PropertyDemoA.wmv
Video 2: http://dl.dropbox.com/u/4745232/PatchySession1.wmv
Video 3: http://dl.dropbox.com/u/4745232/UniformSession1.wmv
MP4 Format:
Video 1: http://dl.dropbox.com/u/4745232/PropertyDemoA.mp4
Video 2: http://dl.dropbox.com/u/4745232/PatchySession1.mp4
Video 3: http://dl.dropbox.com/u/4745232/UniformSession1.mp4
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Figure 1. Interaction between avatars. The screenshot shows the perspective of a Small resident who is
having an interaction with a Large intruder. The participant controls the avatar by clicking on one of the
three buttons showing strike, smile, or leave.

100

resident

intruder

84

83

76

Wins (%)

75
54
46

50

25

24
17

16

0
Large-Large

Large-Small Small-Large

Small-Small

Figure 2. Resident and intruder wins by resident-intruder sizes for disputes over green shrubs in the patchy
condition. Residents have significantly more wins in fights that are Large-Large (n = 240, p < .001,
binomial test), Large-Small (n = 352, p < .001), and Small-Small (n = 190, p < .001). For Small-Large
fights, the difference between Small residents and Large intruders is not significant (n = 232, p = .21).

17

Supplementary Table 1. Uniform Condition: Logit Analysis of Resident Wins
Supplementary Table 1
Uniform Condition: Logit Analysis of Resident Wins
Variable
Coefficient Standard error
p
Hits by resident
0.2169
0.1866
0.245
Smiles by resident
0.0622
0.0383
0.104
Health of resident
0.0034
0.0017
0.043
Hits by Large resident
0.1278
0.2411
0.596
Hits by intruder
-0.0126
0.2155
0.953
Hits by Large intruder
-0.5105
0.2467
0.039
Smiles by intruder
-0.1636
0.0313
0.000
Health of intruder
-0.0016
0.0017
0.349
Time in shrub by resident
0.0482
0.0079
0.000
Marginal effect for dummy variable is P|1 - P|0
Large resident
0.0835
0.0672
0.214
Large intruder
0.0232
0.0640
0.717
Large resident*Large intruder
0.0269
0.0962
0.780
Female resident
0.1372
0.0688
0.046
Female intruder
0.0358
0.0712
0.614
Female resident*Female intruder
-0.1544
0.0890
0.083
Period1
-0.3540
0.0810
0.000
Period2
-0.2172
0.1267
0.087
Period3
-0.0048
0.1540
0.975
Period4
-0.0929
0.1478
0.530
Period5
-0.1600
0.1364
0.241
Period6
-0.2516
0.1120
0.025
Period7
-0.2445
0.1170
0.037
Period8
-0.1120
0.1590
0.481
Period9
-0.1206
0.1350
0.372
Period10
-0.1420
0.1263
0.261
Period11
-0.0474
0.1328
0.721
Period12
-0.0993
0.1293
0.442
Period13
-0.1964
0.1144
0.086
Period14
-0.1293
0.1255
0.303
Period15
0.0114
0.1282
0.929
Period16
0.0418
0.1331
0.754
Period17
0.1389
0.1289
0.282
Period18
0.1396
0.1401
0.319
Period19
-0.1560
0.1208
0.197
Note. Partial derivatives of probabilities with respect to the vector of
characteristics for uniform condition. Values are computed at the means of
the continuous variables and at zero for all dummy variables (n = 589).
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Supplementary Methods. Experiment Instructions for Large Avatar
<page 1>
Welcome
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making. The instructions are simple,
and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions you can earn a considerable
amount of money which will be paid to you in CASH at the end of the experiment.
In this experiment, you will be represented by the avatar you see in the middle of the
screen. You and the 9 other people in the experiment each have the ability to move
around the environment, enter shrubs, and pick berries. The experiment will consist of
many periods each lasting 60 seconds.
<page 2>
Movement
You can move around the environment by left clicking on the spot you wish to move to
(try clicking in the grassy area now). Notice that a red X marks the spot your avatar is
moving towards. You can see shrubs in the environment, but you cannot see the other
people who are also moving in the same environment.
In the top left portion of the screen there is a mini map that displays the environment
including the location of the shrubs you have discovered and your current location
represented by a black square. Areas of the environment that you have not yet visited are
blacked out. Try moving around to see how the mini map works.
You can also enter and exit the shrubs in the environment. Move around until you find a
shrub. Move your avatar completely on top of one of the shrubs and stop. Once your
avatar stops on a shrub you enter it and a new screen appears showing the shrub in an
expanded view.
<page 3>
Inside a Shrub
You can earn points and money by picking berries inside the shrubs.
During a period, shrubs grow berries. The berries remain in the shrub until the end of the
period. At the end of the period, any remaining berries will disappear and new berries
will begin to grow.
To pick a berry, left click on it (try this now). Each berry is worth 1 point. The points you
get will be added to your health points. If you reach the maximum 100 health points, then
your points will go into your bonus points. The points you get will determine your cash
earnings, which we will explain shortly.
Green shrubs produce more berries, and brown shrubs produce less berries. Depending on
the environment, you might find all green, all brown, or a mixture of green and brown
shrubs. To exit a shrub, click on the exit button:
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in the top right area of your screen.
<page 4>
Interaction
If you are in a shrub and another person attempts to enter the same shrub, then both of
you will be involved in an interaction. You will see a new screen with your avatar in
front of the shrub and another person who has approached the shrub. Both people will
have three options:

Smile at the other person

Strike the other person

Leave the shrub
If you strike the other person, you will reduce your own health points by 1 point(s) and
you will cause the other person to lose 5 health points. Larger avatars cause more damage
per strike than smaller avatars.
This interaction will continue until one person leaves the shrub. The remaining person
can go back to picking berries. You cannot enter a shrub in which two people are already
having an interaction.
(Interactions will be disabled until the experiment starts.)
<page 5>
Earnings and Your Health
Your health will decrease over time. Think of it as metabolism. Every 6 seconds your
health points will go down by one point.
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NOTE: If your health falls to zero, then your avatar will die and your participation in the
experiment will end.
Each second your health points are multiplied by 0.0002 and added to your Earnings. For
example, when your health is 25, you are earning 31.25 cents per minute. When your
health is 75, you are earning 93.75 cents per minute. Each berry picked as a bonus is
worth 25 cents and added to your earnings when the berry is picked. If you die by
reaching zero health points, then you stop earning money.
<page 6>
Summary
This is the end of the instructions. The important points are:
(1) Berries add to your health points. Once you reach maximum health, they give you
bonus points.
(2) When someone enters a shrub with another person in it, an interaction screen will
appear. During an interaction, both people can:

Smile

Strike

Leave
Striking others and being hit by others reduces your health.
(3) If your health points fall to 0, then your avatar will die, and you can no longer
earn money in this session.
If you have any questions please raise your hand and a monitor will come by to answer
them. If you are finished with the instructions please press Start. The instructions will
remain on your screen until everyone is ready and the experiment starts. Your health
points will reset to 90 when the experiment begins.
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